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Intellectual property issues in 
• genom1cs 
Rebecca S. Eisenberg----------------------- ---
Controversy over intellectual property rights in the results of large-scale cDNA 
sequencing raises intriguing questions about the roles of the public and private 
sectors in genomics research, and about who stands to benefit (and who stands to 
lose) from the private appropriation of genomic information. While the US Patent 
and Trademark Office has rejected patent applications on cDNA fragments of 
unknown function from the National Institutes of Health, private firms have pursued 
three distinct strategies for exploiting unpatented cDNA sequence information: 
exclusive licensing, non-exclusive licensing and dedication to the public domain. 
Intellectual property issues have been unusually con-
spicuous in the recent history of advances in genomics, 
even by the standards of the patent-weary genetics and 
molecular biology communities. Controversy has been 
particularly acute over intellectual property rights in 
the results of large-scale human cDNA sequencing. 
Beginning in 1991 with the fiJing of patent appli-
cations by the National Institutes of Heakh (NIH) on 
R. S. Eisenberg (rse@umic/1.ed11) is at the University ofMid1igo11 !.Aw 
School, H11td1i11s Hall, 625 South. State Street, Ann Arbor, Ml 
48109, USA. 
the first batch of expressed sequence tags {ESTs) from 
the laboratory of Craig Venter1, each new develop-
ment has been met with lively speculation about its 
strategic significance from an intellectual property per-
spective. Are cDNA. fragments of unknown function 
patentable, or is further research or characterization 
necessary before they satisfy standards of patent law2- 9? 
Will patents on such fragments promote commercial 
investment jn product dcvelopment}.6, or will they 
interfere with scientific communication and collabo-
ration, and retard the overaU research effort5.7·9? Jn the 
absence of patent rights, how may the owners of 
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private cDNA-sequence databases earn a return on 
their investment, while still permitting other investi-
gators to obtain access to the information on reasonable 
terms8,10-12? What are the rights of those who contribute 
resources, such as cDNA libraries, that are used to cre-
ate the databases13•14, and what are the rights of those 
who identify sequences of interest out of the mass of 
information in the databases by formulating appropriate 
querieslS? Will the disclosure of ESTs in the public 
domain preclude patenting of subsequently character-
ized full-length genes and gene products3? And why 
would a conunercial firm invest its own resources in 
generating an EST database for the public domain 16? 
Two factors have contributed to the fascination with 
intellectual property issues in genomics research. The 
first is a perception that some pioneers in large-scale 
cDNA-sequencing have sought to claim intellectual 
property rights that reach far beyond their actual 
achievements to cover the future discoveries of 
others17·18. For example, the controversial NIH patent 
applications claimed not only the ESTs for which 
sequences were actually set forth in the specifications, 
but also the corresponding full-length cDNAs, as well 
as smaller portions of those full-length cDNAs that 
might not even include the disclosed ESTs (Re( 1). 
More recently, private owners of cDNA-sequence 
databases have made access to the databases conditional 
upon agreement in advance to offer either a license or 
a right of first refusal to any resulting intellectual prop-
erty rights1n-12. These efforts to appropriate discoveries 
that have yet to be made by other researchers raise 
issues about the fairness and efficiency of the intellec-
tual property system in allocating rewards and incen-
tives along the path of cumulative innovation. These 
concerns arc particularly compelling to research sci-
entists, who have more than just conunercial interests 
at stake in disputes over claims to inventions19. 
The second factor is the counterintuitive alignment 
ofinterests in the debate20·21 • It was a public institution, 
the NIH, that initially took an aggressive position in 
favor of patenting discoveries that some representatives 
of industry thought were unpatentable and should 
remain unpatented, and it was a major pharmaceuti-
cal firm, Merck & Co., that ultimately took upon itself 
the quasi-governmental function of sponsoring a uni-
versity-based effort to place comparable information 
in the public domain16• These topsy-turvy positions in 
the public and private sectors raise intriguing questions 
about the proper roles of government and industry in 
genomics research, and about who stands to benefit 
(and who stands to lose) from the private appropri-
ation of genomic information22, 
Promoting R&D through exclusive rights 
Research scientists in public institutions are often 
troubled by the concept of intellectual property, 
because they believe that science will advance most 
rapidly if subsequent researchers enjoy free access to prior 
knowledge. By contrast, the law of intellectual prop-
erty rests on an assumption that, without exclusive rights, 
there will be too little investment in R&D (Ref. 23). 
In a commercial setting, a standard argument for 
intellectual property is that inventions are costly to 
make in the first place, but cheap and easy to copy once 
someone else has made them. Firms will, therefore, 
have very little incentive to invest in research and 
development unless they have some means of pre-
venting competitors from reaping the benefits of their 
investment without sharing in the initial risk and cost. 
One way of excluding competitors is to keep inven-
tions secret, but secrecy is not always feasible and may 
be socially undesirable. 
The patent system provides an alternative strategy 
for protecting inventions without secrecy. A patent 
provides the right to exclude others from making. 
using and selling the invention for a limited term - in 
most of the world, this is 20 years from the application 
filing date24,25. In order to get a patent, the inventor 
must disclose the invention fully, so as to enable 
others to make and use it26·27• Within the realm of 
industrial research, it is plausible that the patent sys-
tem promotes more disclosure than would occur if 
secrecy were the only available strategy for excluding 
competitors from using the discovery. This is less clear 
in the case of research in the public sector, which is 
typically published with or without patent protection. 
The argument for patenting inventions made in the 
public sector is a variation on the standard justification 
for patents in the commercial setting, with emphasis 
on the post-invention costs and risks involved in 
taking a new invention out of the laboratory and 
developing it into a successful commercial product, 
rather than the pre-invention costs of making the 
invention in the first place20•21 . The argument is that 
the cost of post-invention development typically far 
exceeds pre-invention research outlays, and firms will 
be unwilling to make this substantial investment with-
out protection from competition if the product proves 
successful. Patents thus facilitate the transfer of technol-
ogy to the private sector by providing exclusive rights 
to preserve the profit incentives of innovating firms. 
Public and private cDNA sequencing 
Such an argument was advanced by the NIH while 
it was pursuing patent rights in the first few thousand 
ESTs identified by Venter and his colleagues328. How-
ever, the response of the intended beneficiaries of the 
NIH patents - the US biotechnology and pharma-
ceutical industries was less than enthusiastic, sug-
gesting that there may be some limits to the logic of 
promoting private appropriation of the result'> of pub-
licly supported research21 • Perhaps this was an example 
of the sort of research discovery that might be more 
eHectively exploited - even by industry- if left in the 
public domain. Ultimately, those particular sequences 
entered the public domain after the US Patent and 
Trademark Office rejected the NIH patent claims29 . 
The NIH did not continue to support the large-scale 
cDNA-sequencing effort that Venter and his 
colleagues had begun in the public sector. Instead, 
Venter and his group turned down a grant from the 
US Department of Energy and left the NIH in 1 992 
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to form a non-profit research organization, The Insti-
tute for Genomic Research (TIGR; Rockville, MD, 
USA), with more generous private-sector funding3°. 
The same financial backers also formed a for-profit 
company, Human Genome Sciences (HGS; 
Rockville, MD, USA), to identify and develop com-
mercial products from the sequence information that 
TIGR developed31• Both organizations were soon 
engaged in a massive automated cDNA-sequencing 
effort, creating two, large, privately held databases of 
sequence information. Meanwhile, another private 
firm, Incyte Pharmaceuticals (Palo Alto, CA, USA) 
had also turned its attention to large-scale sequencing 
of cDNA fragments, creating a competing private 
database32. 
Non-patent strategies for commercial 
exploitation of sequence databases 
Although the database owners are actively seeking 
patent protection on their sequences, and have 
obtained a few patents on sequences encoding identi-
fied peptides with disclosed function33-35, it remains to 
be seen what, if any, patent rights they will ultimately 
obtain in sequences for which they cannot yet provide 
a comparable disclosure36. Meanwhile, they have been 
able to exploit the databases commercially by control-
ling access to them, in effect, using contracts and trade 
secrecy to protect their intellectual property. 
The viability of contract and trade secrecy strategies 
for the protection of sequence information may be 
limited by Merck's entry into the field as sponsor of a 
competing cDNA-sequencing effort at Washington 
University (St Louis, MO, USA), the results of which 
are made immediately available in the public 
domain16,22•37 . The commercial value of private data-
bases is likely to decline as the information in the pub-
lic domain increases; prospective licensees may hesi-
tate to sign restrictive database-access agreements if 
they expect to find comparable information available 
in the near future on an unrestricted basis. 
There are, however, differences in the information 
available from the public and private sources; these dif-
ferences, at least to date, leave the private database 
owners with something to sell. How long this win-
dow of opportunity remains open will depend on 
whether, and how quickly, comparable information 
becomes available in the public domain, and on what 
the private firms do in the interim to maintain their 
advantage. Although the public-domain database is 
growing rapidly38 , at this point, the private databases 
are significantly larger-"9. Owners of the private data-
bases also claim to offer superior products in a num-
ber of respects: they have assembled contiguous frag-
ments of cDNA into longer sequences; they provide 
more-complete annotations for the sequences, includ-
ing information about expression in different types of 
tissue; and their sequence information comes with 
high-powered bioinformatics capabilities and user-
friendly software. Inasmuch as all the information that 
enters the public database also promptly becomes avail-
able in the private databases, the public database can 
TIBTECH AUGUST 1996 (VOL 14) 
never be superior to the private databases. Neverthe-
less, the free availability of the public database enhances 
the value of the sequences it includes as a resource for 
discovery in certain respects. For example, sequences in 
the public database are being mapped40, and the map-
ping information is also promptly made available in the 
public domain, enhancing the value of the public data-
base sequences to positional cloners41. 
The value of the public database could be limited by 
the pending patent applications of private database 
owners. If these applications ripen into issued patents, 
they could subsequently pre-empt the use of any 
sequences that they cover. even if those sequences were 
publicly disclosed prior to issuance of the patents, as 
long as the patent applicants are able to establish their 
priority. Because US patent applications are main-
tained in confidence until a patent is issued42, it is 
impossible to determine, at this stage, what sequences 
have been the subject of patent applications. There-
fore, those who make use of sequences obtained from 
the public database cannot be sure that the sequences 
will remain in the public domain, and may face a 
future injunction against continuing use of sequences 
that are subsequently patented by HGS or lncyte on 
the basis of previously filed patent applications. Of 
course, the same uncertainty applies to sequences 
obtained from the private databases - a sequence 
obtained by a subscriber to the Incyte database might 
turn out to be covered by a previously filed HGS 
patent, for example. Because the Merck initiative got 
off to a late start, its sequences are more likely to be 
covered by prior patent applications of the other firms. 
Exclusive licensing, non-exclusive licensing, and 
the public domain 
Meanwhile, in the absence of issued patents for all 
but a few of their sequences, the owners of private 
databases may be able to convert their current control 
over access to databases into a valuable proprietary 
position in subsequent future research discoveries. The 
actions ofHGS, Incyte and Merck show three distinct 
strategies for exploiting unpatented information: 
exclusive licensing, non-exclusive licensing and 
dedication to the public domain. As each of these 
approaches comes from the private sector, we can 
assume that each firm believes, rightly or wrongly, that 
its strategy will maximize the value it obtains from the 
information. The strategies are quite different, but 
they are interdependent, and it is still too early to tell 
how each will pay off. However, we can see how 
different firms are placing their bets, and we also have 
some idea of the size of those bet~. 
Exclusive licensing 
HGS has sold a three-year exclusive right of access 
to its database to SmithKline Beecham (SB) in ex-
change for US$125 million, to be made in payments over 
a three-year period, plus royalties on product sa1es31 ,43. 
The agreement gives SB a 'right of first refusal' to 
develop and market protein therapeutic and diagnos-
tic products using the information in the database, 
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but it does not cover gene therapy or antisense 
products HGS has entered into separate collabo-
rative agreements with other research partners for the 
development of products in these areas44. During the 
three-year period ofSB's license, investigators in aca-
demic and non-profit institutions may obtain access to 
portions of the database if they and their institutions 
sign a Database Access Agreement45.46 or a Material 
Transfer Agreement10.47 • The terms of these agree-
ments vary depending on whether the sequence was 
identified at TIGR or HGS, and whether it has a 
counterpart in a public database. Access to HGS 
sequences that have not yet been disclosed or have 
been partially disclosed in a public database is per-
mitted only to those who sign a Material Transfer 
Agreement granting 'a sole and exclusive worldwide 
right and license' to HGS to develop any resulting 
products on terms to be negotiated in the future47 . 
Academic investigators may obtain access to TIGR 
sequences that have not yet been disclosed in a public 
database if their institutions sign a Database Option 
Agreement granting HGS 'a sole and exclusive option 
to obtain a sole and exclusive or a non-exclusive 
worldwide royalty bearing license' to resulting prod-
ucts+ 1A2. Sequences that have been disclosed or 
partially disclosed in a public database are available on 
less-restricted terms, but even for these sequences, 
investigators are limited to a specified number of 
queries that may be recorded, stored and monitored 
by the Database Manager16• No outside investigators 
may trawl through the database or manipulate its con-
tents at will, and commercial investigators may not 
obtain access to the database at all. 
An obvious advantage of this exclusive-licensing 
strategy, at least from the perspective ofHGS, is that it 
has generated a lot of revenue. SB placed a very large 
bet, but we don't yet know how it will pay off. An 
obvious concern with the exclusive-licensing ap-
proach is that restricting access to the database to such 
a degree may limit the value that is extracted from the 
information during the term of the exclusive license. 
Indeed, as the term ofSB's exclusive license under the 
original agreement comes to an end, HGS and SB 
appear to be departing from their original exclusive 
licensing strategy in favor of allowing more firms to 
tap into the database. Within the past year, HGS and 
SB have entered into collaborative agreements (or, in 
one case, signed a letter of intent to enter into such an 
agreement) to allow four additional pharmaceutical 
firms [Takeda Chemical Industries+8, Merck KGaA 
(not related to Merck & Co.)49, Schering Plough and 
Synthelabo SA (Re£ 59)] to share access to the data-
base, evaluate the information and develop related 
products. These new collaborators will make total pay-
ments of at least US$140 million to H GS and SB over 
a five-year period, not including milestone payments 
and royalties. In addition to bringing in new revenue, 
it is likely that these new agreements will increase the 
amount that is learned from the database by expand-
ing the universe of investigators who are able to make 
queries. 
Non-exclusive licensing 
lncvte has offered non-exclusive licenses, at a con-
sider;bly cheaper price, to as many firms as will take 
them, with eight firms having signed up as database 
subscribers to date. Upjohn (now Pharmacia & 
Upjohn) and Pfizer have each signed non-exclusive 
agreements with Incyte, involving payments in the 
region of US$20-25 million, including amounts for 
the purchase oflncyte stock, plus royalties on product 
saless0; Novo Nordisk and Hoechst have signed simi-
lar agreements on undisclosed financial terms51 •5~; and 
Abbott Laboratories subsequently signed an agree-
ment that Incyte characterized in a press release as 'the 
largest financial commitment by a subscriber to date', 
although these terms include payment for sequencing 
microbial genomes53. When Incyte announced its 
sixth subscriber, Johmon & Johnson, the accompany-
ing press release claimed that the six subscribers >vill 
pay a minimum combined total of US$100 million, 
excluding contingent payments such as milestones and 
product royalties54. Since that announcement, Incyte 
has entered into additional agreements vv1.th Hoffinann-
La Rochess and Zeneca56• Incyte's subscribers have 
placed smaller individual bets than SB did but, in the 
long run, there could be quite a number of subscribers. 
Although the HGS strategy initially appeared to 
generate more revenue for the database owner, Incyte's 
strategy may yet prove to be more lucrative. One might 
expect that Incyte's window of opportunity for sign-
ing up new subscribers would be closing as the Merck-
sponsored sequencing effort at Washington University 
expands the competing public database; however, all 
but the first oflncyte's subscribers have signed up since 
Merck announced its competing effort. 
From a broader social standpoint, the size of the ulti-
mate payoffs is more interesting than the size of the 
bets placed. Which approach will yield more dis-
coveries or commercial products? Although the non-
exclusive strategy seems more likely to take advantage 
of the different capabilities of different commercial firms, 
a drawback of the Incyte approach is that the company 
has not yet figured out how to make its database avail-
able to academic investigators without undermining its 
value to corporate subscribers. At present, academic 
investigators may only obtain access to the database by 
collaborating with one oflncyte's subscribers. 
Public domain 
The Merck strategy of putting sequence information 
in the public domain is the newest approach and, at 
least at first glance, the most puzzling. How does this 
strategy advance Merck's own interests? By putting the 
information in the public domain, Merck can gener-
ate the information more cheaply indeed, almost 
unbelievably cheaply. Merck is placing a very small bet, 
somewhere under US$10 million57; this is a fraction 
of the amounts spent by Pfizer and Upjohn for their 
non-exclusive deals with lncyte, and a tiny fraction of 
the amount spent by SB for its exclusive deal with HGS. 
By positioning itself as a public benefactor, Merck 
is able to take advantage of existing infrastructure 
TIBTECH AUGUST 1996 (VOL 14) 
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at Washington University, previously put in place with 
public funds, for use in its sequencing effort. Merck 
has also been able to obtain other inputs at nominal 
cost that it would have had to pay a premium for if it 
were trying to assemble a private databaseB. 
Apart from generating the sequence information 
more cheaply, Merck claims that it expects to derive 
more benefit from the information by distributing it 
widely58. As Merck sees it, the sequence information 
will not yield products for commercial development 
until further fundamental research is done to elucidate 
the functions and biological pathways associated with 
the partially sequenced genes. Merck's comparative 
advantage does not lie in performing this fundamen-
tal research, but rather in developing specific drugs at 
a later stage in the R&D process. Nothing compels 
researchers who use the database to bring any poten-
tial products to Merck for commercial development, 
but Merck is confident that its capabilities and 
resources will allow it to capture an adequate share of 
resulting products to justify its modest investment in 
generating the database. 
Some observers have suggested a more cynical moti-
vation: that Merck seeks to undermine the value of 
investments already made in existing sequence data-
bases by its commercial competitors58• Putting the 
information in a public database leaves HGS and 
Incyte (and their collaborators) dependent on patent 
rights to protect their proprietary positions in the long 
run, and Merck may be betting that they won't obtain 
much in the way of patent rights. 
The Merck data may enhance the value of existing 
databases as a resource for discovery, but it plainly 
undermines the value of the databases as intellectual 
property, at least to the extent that they are unpro-
tected by patent rights. This distinction highlights the 
very different ways in which the sequence information 
is valued by Merck on the one hand, and HGS and 
Incyte on the other. From Merck's perspective, cDNA 
sequences are research tools for use in drug discovery, 
not products for sale to consumers. For HGS and 
Incyte, cDNA sequences are, themselves, an immedi-
ate source of revenue. 
Merck's own strategy for making money does not 
rely on maintaining a proprietary position in cDNA 
sequences, so it has little to lose, and possibly some-
thing to gain, by putting such sequences in the public 
domain. Merck does not have any therapeutic protein 
or DNA diagnostic products that might require pro-
prietary rights in DNA sequences to be commercially 
viable. Far more important to Merck's commercial 
position are its proprietary rights in the small mol-
ecules that it hopes to develop and sell as pharma-
ceutical products. 
Apart from the question of whether Merck makes 
any money out of the sequence information that goes 
into the public domain, it will be interesting to see 
how other firms and publicly funded investigators put 
this information to use. Will the non-proprietary 
character of the information lead commercial firms to 
shun the data for tear of being unable to exclude com-
TIBTECH AUGUST 1996 (VOL 14J 
petitors from the market for any resulting products, or 
will the public database be actively and widely 
exploited? Preliminary indications suggest that as the 
data come on line they are raising considerable inter-
est, with accessions to GenBank showing a dramatic 
increase.38• A large part of this increase has come in the 
form of anonymous file transfer protocol (ftp) down-
loads of the entire database, a form of query that is likely 
to be popular with commercial users who do not want 
to risk showing their hands to competitors by leaving 
an electronic record of what it is they are looking for. 
Public versus private 
These three different approaches highlight striking 
differences in the interests of different companies in 
proprietary rights in the human genome: HGS and 
Incyte may benefit from a strategy that promotes the 
private appropriation of DNA sequences, whereas 
Merck may benefit from a strategy that puts these 
sequences in the public domain. One firm's research 
tool may be another firm's end product. However, in 
an important sense, the fact that Merck chooses to put 
cDNA sequences in the public domain is more 
instructive than the fact that HGS and Incyte choose 
to appropriate them as private property. Whenever 
new property rights come into view, someone will step 
forward to claim them, and it is unsurprising to hear 
the claimants assert that private ownership will 
enhance the public welfare. It is far more uncommon 
for a private firm to disclaim proprietary rights in the 
information it generates and to sing the praises of the 
public domain. 
The Merck initiative raises fundamental questions 
about the boundaries between public and private in 
research science and product development. Previously, 
one could give a coherent account of these boundaries 
in theory, however blurred they may have been in 
practice: public research tended to focus on the pur-
suit of fundamental knowledge that was not readily 
appropriable by a private owner, and that would have 
the greatest social value ifit was widely distributed \vith 
no restrictions on its use; by contrast, private research 
tended to focus on narrower applications of scientific 
principles that were readily appropriable by innovat-
ing firms, and these firms required proprietary rights 
to make their investments in R&D profitable. Publicly 
supported research was presumptively placed in the 
public domain, while privately supported research was 
typically appropriated as intellectual property. 
These boundaries are now more difficult to maintain, 
particularly in fields of such obvious commercial inter-
est as genomics. Researchers in the public and private 
sectors are often working on the same problems, 
whether competitively or collaboratively, and the pre-
vailing wisdom is that institutions performing publicly 
sponsored research should patent their discoveries to 
promote commercial development. In this environ-
ment, we lack a clear strategy about when it makes 
sense for the public to sponsor research, and when it 




When public policy promotes the private appropri-
ation of research results as intellectual property, even 
when they emerge from public sector research, it is 
easy to lose sight of the public and private benefits of 
disseminating information in the public domain. The 
most obvious of these benefits is that free availability 
encourages widespread use of information and mini-
mizes transaction costs. Travel on a freeway is both 
cheaper and faster than travel on a route 'With numer-
ous tollbooths. Similarly, R&D is cheaper and faster if 
it uses resources that are freely available than it is if the 
road to product development requires frequent stops 
to negotiate licenses for access to prior discoveries. 
Free roadways can also enhance the value of private 
property by making it more readily accessible. Thus, 
free dissemination of information via the Internet 
helps firms attract customers. A vigorous public 
domain can supply a meeting place for people, infor-
mation and ideas that might not come together in the 
course of more organized, licensed encounters. For 
fields of research that draw heavily upon work carried 
out in the public sector and in academia, it is particu-
larly relevant that information in the public domain is 
accessible to relatively poorly funded users who would 
otherwise be priced out of the market. Thus, for 
example, if academic researchers are particularly im-
portant to the progress of research in a field, as Merck 
evidently believes they are for understanding the human 
genome, then the overall research enterprise could be 
significantly retarded by property rights that restrict 
their access to essential resources and information. 
If, in fact, ESTs have more social value in the pub-
lic domain than in the hands of private owners, per-
haps government sponsors should have taken upon 
themselves the burden of supplying this resource to the 
public, rather than leaving it to the private sector. On 
the other hand, perhaps the extent of private-sector 
interest in supporting large-scale cDNA sequencing 
indicates that this work does not require government 
funding, and that public resources would be better 
spent on other projects. The Merck initiative invites 
the optimistic conclusion that there are limits to how 
far the government can go wrong - that if the stakes 
are high enough, someone in the private sector may 
find it worthwhile to correct for any errors in judge-
ment on the part of the government, and maybe even 
to pick up the tab. It would, however, be foolish to 
conclude on the basis of this extraordinary episode that 
we can rely on the private sector to enrich the public 
domain while public research institutions pursue 
patent rights. Perhaps a better lesson to draw, is that 
we may have underestimated the value, to the private 
sector as well as to the public sector, of a rich public 
domain, and that we may need to reconsider the 
limits of private appropriation of new information as 
a means of promoting commercial development. 
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